

P R E F A C E

NOTES ON PAPERS CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICE OF REPORTS
AND ESTIMATES OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ("J" SERIES)

The seventeen papers in this series were written for the Historical Staff during 1952 and 1953. They were either furnished by specific direction of the Historian, or grew out of assistance required by him in producing the History of Central Intelligence 1940-1950.

The only continuity among these papers is furnished by the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group and Agency (1946-1950) to which all of them bear more or less reference. They are arranged accordingly, as see outline below. The numbering system used in this arrangement is applied to the frequent cross references necessary within individual studies.

HISTORICAL STAFF

PAPERS TOUCHING ON THE HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

1946-1951

A. INTERNAL PROBLEMS

1. Organizational Development of the Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1950
2. Controversies within the Office of Reports and Estimates, 1948-1950

B. EXTERNAL PROBLEMS

3. The "Defense Project," First Post-War Experiment in Cooperative Interdepartmental Intelligence Production
4. Some Problems in Producing Current Intelligence and Current Estimates
5. Aspects of the Problem of Inter-Agency Exchange of Information in the Period, 1946-1950
6. Problems in Inter-Agency Coordination of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1949

C. COMMENTS ON THE PRODUCTION RECORD OF THE OFFICE

7. Analysis of Current Events, 1946 and Early 1947
8. Origin and Nature of the "CIA Review of the World Situation"
9. Analysis of Estimates Contained in the "CIA Review of the World Situation," September 1947 - January 1950
10. The Central Intelligence Agency's "Situation Reports," 1947-1951
11. Note on the Intelligence Memorandum (IM) Series, 1948-1950
12. Review of Formal Reports and Estimates Produced under the Central Intelligence Group and Agency, 1946-mid-1948
13. The Abortive Estimate Concerning the Czechoslovak Coup of February 1948

14. The Record of Central Intelligence before 1951 with respect to the Korean War

D. MISCELLANEOUS

15. Recollections of the Office of Research and Evaluations in 1946
16. Note of the "March War Scare" of 1948
17. Divergent Views on the Function of Speculative Reasoning in Intelligence Estimates

INDEX OF PAPERS

1. Organizational Changes, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1950
3. Self-Criticism within the Office of Reports and Estimates
4. Some Problems of the Daily and Weekly Summaries, 1946-1950
5. Some Aspects of the Problem of Inter-Agency Exchange of Information in the Period 1946-1950
6. Problems in Inter-Agency Coordination of Reports and Estimates to 1949
7. The "Defense Project," First Post-War Experiment in Cooperative Interdepartmental Intelligence Production
8. Current Reporting 1946 and Early 1947
9. The CIA "Review of the World Situation" 1947-1950
10. Analysis of Estimates Contained in the Central Intelligence Agency Monthly "Review of the World Situation," September 1947 - January 1950
11. Brief Note on the Intelligence Memorandum (IM) Series, 1948-1950
12. Review of Estimates Produced under the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-mid-1948
13. The Central Intelligence Agency's "Situation Reports," 1947-1951

16. The Record of Central Intelligence Before 1951 with Respect to the Korean War
17. The Record of Central Intelligence with Respect to the Czechoslovak Coup of February, 1948
18. Note on the "March War Scare" of 1948
19. Recollections of the Office of Research and Evaluation

TENTATIVE REVISION OF FILE (CSJ 7/8/53)

NEW NUMBERS AND TITLES

OLD NUMBERS AND TITLES

1. Organizational Changes, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1950

II. Development of CRS-ORE February 1946-July 1947

III. Organization of CRS

IV. ORE Organizational Development

XII. Notes of ORE Organization and Reorganization

XXII. Effect of Certain Basic Directives on the Development of CIA During the Hillenkoetter Regime

XXIV. Add to ORE Organizational Plans

2. Notes on Internal "Branch" Organization in the Office of Reports and Estimates

XXV. Branch Organization

3. Some Reasons for a Revised Concept of "Strategic and National Policy Intelligence" as Developed in the Office of Reports and Estimates

XV. ORE's Departure from Strategic and National Policy Intelligence (and Note)

4. The Problem of Selection in the Production of Intelligence Estimates

X. The Problem of Selection in the Production of Intelligence Estimates

XVIII. Difficulties in Creating a System for Initiating Projects

CERTAIN PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE

5. ~~The Production Summary~~ Notes on the Production Summary, 1947

V. Problems of the Daily and Weekly Summaries 1947

6. The First Internal Survey Attempted by the Office of Reports and Estimates (The "Reitzel Report")

XXIII. The "First Report of the (ORE) Ad Hoc Production view Subcommittee", better known as the "Reitzel Report"

7. The Second Survey (the "Stout Report")	XXVII. Stout Report (Notes and Addendum)
9. Development of the Office of Reports and Estimates as an independent "competitor"	XX. Problems of Coordination: Unilateral Emendation: Post-Publication Dissents: The Director's Authority with Respect to Inadmissible Dissents
10. The Problem of Inter-Agency Exchange of Information	XIV. Quicksand: The Story of the Publications Review Subcommittee
10. The Development of Inter-Agency Coordination	IX. The Problem of Coordination XXI. Stages in the Development of an Inter-Agency Coordination System for National Intelligence Estimates with Special Reference to the Coordination Problems of 1947-1948
11. Current Intelligence Reporting in the Daily and Weekly Summaries 1946 and Early 1947	XI. Review of Publication 1946-1947 (in part)
12. The Monthly Review of the World Situation 1947 to January 1950	XIII. ORE Current Reporting 1946 and Early 1947
12. Appendix 11 to No. 12: <i>Dispatches Received 1947-1950</i>	XXXII. The CIA Review of the World Situation 1947-1950 (<i>And appendix A</i>)
13. The "Defense Project", First Attempt at Coordinated Intelligence	XXXII. Appendix A B (<i>Original and Development, and Disposition</i>)
	VI. Defense Project
	VII. Telephone Conversation with Jack Maury Regarding Defense Project

14. <i>Brief Memo on the Intelligence Memoranda</i> 15. <i>The CIA Situation Reports</i> 16. Formal Coordinated Estimates Produced 1946-1949	XI. Review of Publication in "ORE" Series (Excluding ORE-1). July 1946-July 1947 XVII. Supplement to XI XXIX. Estimate Review 1947-1948
17. Record of the Office Respecting Czechoslovakia 1948	XXX. CIA and the Czech Coup
18. Record of the Office Respecting Korea, 1946-1950	I. ORE's Estimates on the Subject of Korea
19. <i>Recollections of</i> the Office of Research and Evaluations in late 1946	IV. ORE's Departure from Strategic and National Policy Intelligence (APPENDIX)
20. <i>Committees</i> 21. The Place of Speculation in Intelligence Estimates	VIII. The Place of Speculation in Intelligence Estimates
22. The Concept of "National Security" as Applied to the Selection of National Estimates	XXVI. "National Security" and Estimates
23. The March 1948 "War Scare" 25X1C	XXXVII. Clay's March War Scare
24. [REDACTED]	XXXVI. [REDACTED] 25X1C

Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020003-8

CANCELLED PAPERS

- XVI. The Parody Issue of the Daily and Weekly Summaries
- XIX. Plan for Coordination through use of Teletype Circuit
- XX. Responsibility and Authority for Production of Staff Intelligence in ORE
- XXI. [REDACTED] Comments on SR-20 (Germany)
- XXIV. Proposals for an Analysis of Past Estimates
- XXVIII. Development of the CIA Estimate on Sino-Soviet Relations
- XXV. Footnote to Page 12 of No. II (Story of ORE-75-48)

25X1A

Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020003-8